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EUROPEAN BORDERS IN TURBULENT TIMES: 
THE CASE OF THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN 
‘EXTENDED BORDERLAND’
This article presents one of the most salient aspects of the migration crisis in the 
EU, namely the turbulent management of external borders, and analyzing it in 
the case of the central region of the Mediterranean Sea. The study is focused on 
risks and threats to the security of the European Union and its member states, 
particularly Italy, posed by negative aspects of migratory flows and accompany-
ing phenomena such as migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings, drug 
smuggling or document frauds. For this purpose, a concept of ‘extended border-
land’ is applied as particularly suitable for analyzing border-security policies and 
actions undertaken by the European Union. The argument developed in this 
article is that the Central Mediterranean area has been converted into an extend-
ed borderland where conventional systems, methods and tools of border man-
agement are superseded by spatial taming created by international actors acting 
through joint maritime operations. 
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The European Union is one of the most attractive areas for international migrants and 
has long been one of their main destinations. According to Eurostat, in 2016 the num-
ber of people living in the EU who were citizens of non-member countries was 20.7 mil-
lion (4 percent of the total EU population) while the number of people who had been 
born outside of the EU was 35.1 million (6.9 percent of the total EU population).1 
A significant part of immigrant population resides illegally in the EU or does not have 
1 Eurostat, “Migration and Migrant Population Statistics”, March 2017, at <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat 
/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics>, 29 September 2017.
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the necessary authorization. The total number of such ‘irregular’ migrants is difficult to 
be estimated. The number of irregular immigrants detected (found to be illegally pres-
ent and apprehended by national authorities) on the territory of the EU in 2016 was 
983,860, which meant a significant drop from the record high of 2.2 million in 2015.2 
However, the overall number of unauthorized residents from non-EU countries is esti-
mated to be much higher as a result of the recent migration crisis in Europe.
Unauthorized immigrants reach the territory of EU Member States following sev-
eral main transit routes. Traditionally, these routes have been found in the southern and 
eastern parts of the European continent. The migration crisis which started in 2014 
has proved this feature: migrants and asylum seekers have preferred channels and en-
try points located in the Mediterranean region. The migratory pressure at the external 
borders of the European Union has produced considerable security dilemmas and chal-
lenges confronting not only the ‘frontline’ countries of the south of Europe but also 
EU institutions, agencies as well as strategies and policies adopted at the transnational 
level. The issue of an effective, comprehensive, integrated management of border con-
trols has been put high on the EU’s migration and asylum agenda. Moreover, it also has 
been presented as a top security measure strongly needed for tackling effectively nega-
tive consequences of migratory inflows.
This article aims at presenting one of the most salient aspects of the migration cri-
sis in the EU, namely the turbulent management of external borders, and analyzing it 
in the framework of border studies.3 Security aspects of border control and protection 
will be highlighted and illustrated by the case of the central Mediterranean Sea. De-
spite building on the mainstream border studies scholarship, this research focuses on 
risks and threats to the security of the European Union and its member states, particu-
larly Italy, posed by negative aspects of migratory flows and accompanying phenomena 
such as migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings, drug smuggling or document 
frauds. For this purpose, a concept of ‘extended borderland’ is applied, partially draw-
ing from Brunet-Jailly and Dupeyron’s ‘agent-power’ concept, partially from Martínez’s 
borderland ‘paradigms’. The extended borderland perspective is particularly suitable 
for analyzing border-security policies and actions undertaken by the European Union 
acting through its institutions, agencies and bodies.
The argument developed in this article is that the Central Mediterranean area has 
been converted into an extended borderland in which conventional systems, methods 
and tools of border management are superseded by spatial taming created by interna-
tional actors acting through joint maritime operations. As a result, territorial waters of 
2 Eurostat, “Statistics on Enforcement of Immigration Legislation”, at <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
statistics-explained/index.php/Statistics_on_enforcement_of_immigration_legislation>, 29 Septem-
ber 2017.
3 D. Wastl-Walter (ed.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies, Farnham–Burlington, 
VT 2011; T.M. Wilson, H. Donnan (eds.), A Companion to Border Studies, Malden–Oxford 2012; 
N.A. Naples, J. Bickham-Mendez (eds.), Border Politics. Social Movements, Collective Identities, and 
Globalization, New York–London 2015; L. Weber (ed.), Rethinking Border Control for a Globalizing 
World. A Preferred Future, Abingdon–New York 2015. 
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Italy and Libya as well as the central Mediterranean high seas were incorporated into 
the extended borderland characterized by the emergence of high-intensity conflict eco-
system which considerably diminishes prospects for managing and solving the migra-
tory crisis.
The paper proceeds as follows: the first section discusses the theoretical and con-
ceptual framework of extended borderland with reference to mainstream border stud-
ies as well as specific security-oriented concepts of border management and forward 
protection; the next part draws an overall picture of the consequences of intensive mi-
gratory flows in the Mediterranean Basin with a special focus on the central part of this 
area; the final part provides empirical examples of activities undertaken by the EU and 
national actors in the Central Mediterranean extended borderland.
EXTENDED BORDERLAND: A CONCEPTUALIZATION
Border studies truly have boomed since the beginning of the 21st century due to the 
need to reconsider earlier concepts and theories of borders, bordering and boundaries 
against the new backdrop of global processes of mobility, transfering and communica-
tion as well as de- and re-territorialization. In addition, the security perspective and 
the view of the border as the state’s ‘protective shield’ against major threats and risks of 
‘external’ provenience have strongly affected the further development of border studies 
in recent years. A research agenda put forward at the beginning of the present century 
focused on delineation of new concepts and ideas relating to boundaries which were not 
part of the traditional study of boundaries – in particular, notions of inclusion and exclu-
sion, non-geographic boundaries, the management of boundaries as institutions and the 
means through which trans-boundary movement may take place.4 However, the effects of 
‘re-bordering’5 after 9/11 and securitization of state borders have shifted the center of 
gravity in border studies to the issues of policing, surveillance, remote control, crimi-
nal prevention and even militarization.6 Therefore, the notion of the border has trans-
gressed not only the traditional framework of theory and analysis, but also those con-
cepts which were formulated in the late 20th century at the dawn of globalization and 
4 D. Newman, “On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework”, Journal of Borderlands Studies, 
vol. 18, no. 1 (2003), p. 16, at <https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2003.9695598>. See also idem, 
“Contemporary Research Agendas in Border Studies: An Overview”, in D. Wastl-Walter (ed.), The 
Ashgate Research Companion…, pp. 33-47; A. Paasi, “A Border Theory: An Unattainable Dream or 
a Realistic Aim for Border Scholars?”, in D. Wastl-Walter (ed.), The Ashgate Research Companion…, 
pp. 11-31. 
5 P. Andreas, “Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-First Century”, International 
Security, vol. 28, no. 2 (2003), pp. 78-111, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/016228803322761973>.
6 See for instance Ch. Leuprecht, T. Hataley, R. Nossal (eds.), Evolving Transnational Threats and Bor-
der Security. A New Research Agenda, Kingston, Ont. 2012; G. Andreopoulos (ed.), Policing Across 
Borders. Law Enforcement Networks and the Challenges of Crime Control, New York 2013; C. Kinnvall, 
T. Svensson (eds.), Governing Borders and Security. The Politics of Connectivity and Dispersal, Abing-
don–New York 2015; L. Weber (ed.), Rethinking Border Control…
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digital revolution. Border as a term and a concept was gradually repealed or superseded 
by such designators as transitional spaces, bounded territories/spaces, borderscapes and 
borderlands.
The above formulated reflection has accompanied the perception of border issues 
as part of the processes of European integration. Although some claimed that Europe 
itself should be represented as borderland,7 mainstream research focused on the issue 
of Europe’s confines and Europe’s surroundings (neighborhood). This was due to the 
fact that border studies on contemporary Europe appeared as a reflection on territorial 
boundaries of the spillover of integrative patterns. That was specifically highlighted 
during the process of Eastern enlargement in which the issue of ‘shifting borders east-
ward’ was discussed in ideological, ethical, territorial, economic, cultural and – last but 
not least – security terms. Some authors even argued that the process [of Eastern en-
largement – A.G.] will eventually entirely reshape the territorial, political, institutional, 
economic, and perhaps even, cultural contours of the European and Eurasian landmass.8 
However, a parallel enlargement track, that of extending the Schengen free-travel area, 
pointed to other aspects of border security: the need to modernize, enhance and inte-
grate national systems of management of external borders of the EU and the necessity 
to reconfigure control and surveillance mechanisms within the Schengen zone due to 
the abolition of checks at internal borders. As a result, several interesting and valuable 
conceptual proposals were launched, addressing such matters as trans-European trans-
port networks (the concept of networked border transformed into a mobile, non-con-
tiguous zone9), population surveillance and remote ‘biopolitical’ control (the concepts 
of biometric bordering, portable borders, biopolitical border and zones of indetermi-
nation10) or deterritorialization and debordering of movement of persons (the concept 
of cosmopolitan borders11).
7 E. Balibar, “Europe as Borderland”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, vol. 27, no. 2 
(2009), pp. 190-215, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/d13008>.
8 J. O’Brennan, The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, Abingdon–New York 2006, p. 115.
9 W. Walters, “Border/Control”, European Journal of Social Theory, vol. 9, no. 2 (2006), pp. 187-203, at 
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1368431006063332>.
10 L. Amoore, “Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror”, Political Geography, 
vol.  25, no. 3 (2006), pp. 336-351, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2006.02.001>; H. van 
Baar, “Evictability and the Biopolitical Bordering of Europe”, Antipode, vol. 49, no. 1 (2016), pp. 212-
230, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/anti.12260>; W. Walters, “Secure Borders, Safe Haven, Domo-
politics”, Citizenship Studies, vol. 8, no. 3 (2004), pp. 237-260, at <https://doi.org/10.1080/1362102
042000256989>; A. Cooper, Ch. Rumford, “Cosmopolitan Borders: Bordering as Connectivity”, in 
M. Rovisco, M. Nowicka (eds.), Ashgate Companion to Cosmopolitanism, Farnham 2011, pp. 261-276; 
D. Bigo, “Du panoptisme au Ban-optisme. Les micros logiques du contrôle dans la mondialisation”,
in P.-A. Chardel (ed.), Technologies de contrôle dans la mondialisation. Enjeux politiques, éthiques et es-
thétiques, Paris 2009, pp. 59-80; idem, “Detention of Foreigners, States of Exception, and the Social
Practices of Control of the Banopticon”, in P.K. Rajaram, C. Grundy-Warr (eds.), Borderscapes. Hidden 
Geographies and Politics at Territory’s Edge, Minneapolis–London, pp. 3-33. 
11 A. Cooper, Ch. Rumford, “Cosmopolitan Borders...”.
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The issue of surroundings (‘external environment’, ‘outer space’ or neighborhood) 
of the European Union has prevailed in border studies since the beginning of the pres-
ent century. It was underlined that the EU’s neighborhood is a source of a wide range 
of ‘non-traditional’ security threats and risks such as terrorism, migratory movements, 
organized crime, poverty and civil wars, which need to be prevented and deterred by an 
effective cooperation in home affairs and integrated management of external borders. 
Moreover, an external action is also necessary to address challenges posed by structural 
causes of instability, poverty and weaknesses of states and societies in third countries, 
especially those of the ‘global South’.12 Highlighting the human dimension of security 
(human security), which encompasses access to basic goods and services, healthy and 
safe environment, protection from physical violence and preservation of traditional val-
ues and identities as well as protection of civil and political rights, the European Union 
has placed a special emphasis on humanitarian aspects of its neighborhood policy seek-
ing to link together ‘exclusionary’ effects of its security policies (border protection, pre-
vention and fight against criminality and terrorism, combating illegal migration and 
human smuggling) with ‘inclusionary’ mechanisms (financial aid and technical assis-
tance, humanitarian actions, integration of immigrants). In this context, external bor-
ders of the EU were perceived from a specific multidimensional perspective, combining 
‘borderwork’ with protective measures at the borders, forward presence in the neigh-
borhood as well as proactive initiatives for neighboring states and societies.
The concept of borderland appears to be especially adequate to take up the matters 
related to borders, boundaries and confines of the European integration space. How-
ever, hitherto concepts and theoretical proposals seem to lack satisfactory explanatory 
elements, particularly in the face of new security demands concerning border controls 
and immigration control which have loomed large since the beginning of the recent 
migration crisis. Therefore, a notion of ‘extended borderland’ is going to be introduced 
and explained.
Oscar Martínez built a complex set of models (‘paradigms’13) of borderlands under-
lining dynamics and complexity of interactions based on cross-border movements. He 
distinguished four types of borderlands: (1) alienated, (2) coexistent, (3) interdepen-
dent, and (4) integrated. Alienated borderlands preclude ordinary, regular cross-border 
traffic and interchange because of fundamental structural obstacles such as animosity, 
rivalry, disputes, political antagonisms and military tensions. Coexistent borderlands 
emerge when border-related conflicts are reduced to a scope enabling cross-border co-
operation though maintained at a relatively low level, particularly in social and eco-
nomic dimensions. Interdependent borderlands are founded on the symbiosis between 
adjacent border regions stimulating growth and development by an intense mutually 
beneficial exchange of goods, services, capital and labour. Integrated borderlands blur 
12 See P. Rieker (ed.), External Governance as Security Community Building. The Limits and Potential of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy, London 2016; Ch. Kaunert, S. Léonard (eds.), European Security 
Governance and the European Neighbourhood after the Lisbon Treaty, London–New York 2013.
13 O.J. Martinez, “The Dynamics of Border Interaction. New Approaches to Border Analysis”, in 
C.H. Schofield (ed.), Global Boundaries. World Boundaries, vol. 1, London–New York 1994, p. 2.
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in practice political, territorial, market and cultural division lines typical for the clas-
sical concept of sovereignty. Societies and markets merge, border controls are disman-
tled, an intense diffusion of cultural patterns, technology and knowledge underpins the 
emergence of an economic, cultural and societal borderland community.14
I wish to enrich this taxonomy by adding the fifth model, that of extended border-
land. It is based on a sharp asymmetry between bordering regions (or communities, or 
states) which triggers both asymmetrical forms of cross-border interactions and strange 
heterarchical loops.15 Asymmetry does not necessarily entail imbalance, rather it en-
compasses the techniques of resilience and restraint16 tending to differentiation and con-
nectivity reflected in general-purpose and task-specific matters. Asymmetry also refers 
to ‘strategic mindsets’ of actors determining the dynamic of developments and process-
es unfolding in an extended borderland. As Breen and Geltzer underline, asymmetric 
strategies transform an adversary’s perceived strength into a vulnerability, often by reveal-
ing one’s own perceived vulnerability as a strength.17
Extended borderland blends ‘hard’ with ‘soft’ facts, i.e. strict, institutionalized pro-
tective and security-oriented measures at the borders with social and cultural phe-
nomena determining construction of boundaries.18 This division corresponds with 
Hassner’s distinction between fixed borders and moving borderlands.19 In addition, ex-
tended borderland addresses the issue of ‘porosity’ of borders in a selective way, includ-
ing mechanisms of deterrence and border sealing as well as active forward presence and 
rapid reaction.
Extended borderland is replete with a host of actors (local/national, borderland/
cross-border, international and transnational) performing the whole variety of roles, 
functions and tasks within a given borderland. Their competences sometimes overlap, 
sometimes clash, which results in the emergence of a specific dense networked environ-
ment based on symbiotic coexistence. It incorporates agent power of individual ties and 
forces, broad social processes framing individual actions, and norms and institutions 
(formal and informal) as well as culture and identity (self-awareness) of a borderland.20 
Such an ‘ecosystem’ fosters mechanisms of self-reference and reproduction which un-
derpin the logic of confrontation and cooperation. 
14 Ibid., pp. 2-5.
15 See D. Hofstadter, I Am a Strange Loop, New York 2007, pp. 102-110.
16 J. Leech, Asymmetries of Conflict. War without Death, London–New York 2014, p. xv.
17 M. Breen, J.A. Geltzer, “Asymmetric Strategies as Strategies of the Strong”, Parameters, vol. 41, no. 1 
(2011), p. 41.
18 See K. Eder, “Europe’s Borders. The Narrative Construction of the Boundaries of Europe”, 
European Journal of Social Theory, vol. 9, no. 2 (2006), pp. 255-271, at <https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
1368431006063345>.
19 P. Hassner, “Fixed Borders or Moving Borderlands? A New Type of Border for a New Type of Entity”, 
in J. Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound. Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union, 
London–New York 2002.
20 See E. Brunet-Jailly, B. Dupeyron, “Introduction. Borders, Borderlands, and Porosity”, in E. Brunet-
-Jailly (ed.), Borderlands. Comparing Border Security in North America and Europe, Ottawa 2007, p. 1.
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Extended borderland is a kinetic system of interconnected actors, rules and re-
sources existing in vast communication, political, economic and – last but not least – 
territorial realms. The latter means that boundaries of extended borderland are not 
confined to a delimited territory, even if it is administratively established. Due to the 
networked architecture of extended borderland, its boundaries move beyond admin-
istrative/territorial frontiers. Spontaneous movements and varied forms of exchange 
emerge as a consequence of synergetic connections between the actors and expected 
gains from arbitration in situations of conflict or feud. 
THE MIGRATION CRISIS IN THE EU AND CENTRAL 
MEDITERRANEAN
Immigration to the EU has been influenced by numerous political, economic and social 
factors originating in neighboring regions and more distant areas. Economic prosper-
ity, public order and political stability have been attracting both economic immigrants 
and refugees. The EU’s neighborhood since the late 1980s has generated migratory 
pressure resulting from social and political crises (Eastern Europe), protracted instabil-
ity (the Middle East), civil wars (the Balkans), long-term military campaigns (South 
Asia), ethnic conflicts (Turkey, the Balkans) or revolutions (North Africa). Immigrants 
from the Balkans, Eastern Europe or Turkey have been motivated mostly by economic 
gains, social benefits and career opportunities. Victims of armed conflicts, violence and 
oppression in the Middle East, South Asia and North Africa have been heading for Eu-
rope as the closest refuge. People suffering extreme poverty, hunger, famine or inhuman 
exploitation in the Horn of Africa and sub-Saharan part of the African continent have 
chosen Europe as a sanctuary. Immigration also has been triggered by humanitarian 
principles applicable in the European Union, particularly the right to family reunifica-
tion and protection of asylum seekers and refugees.21
Following the migration crisis in the early 1990s, provoked by the massive inflow of 
nationals of East European countries in the wake of the fall of Communist regime and 
acute protracted economic crisis, the European Union sought to set some formal stan-
dards and adopt legal instruments facilitating cross-border movements of persons and 
enhancing effectiveness of the management of external borders and asylum policies. It 
brought about certain achievements in the field of asylum, visa, migration and border 
management enough to manage migratory flows effectively and avoid serious crises.22
The second decade of the 21st century began with turbulent developments in the 
EU’s neighborhood. The turmoil in North Africa, provoked by anti-government up-
21 See A. Gruszczak, “Immigration Control and Securing the EU’s External Borders”, in E. Stadtmüller, 
K. Bachmann (eds.), The EU’s Shifting Borders. Theoretical Approaches and Policy Implications in the
New Neighbourhood, London–New York 2012, pp. 213-226.
22 G. Lahav, Immigration and Politics in the New Europe. Reinventing Borders, Cambridge 2004; S. Peers, 
N. Rogers (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law (Text and Commentary), Leiden–Boston 2006.
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risings during the so-called Arab Spring in 2011 and the subsequent NATO’s military 
intervention in Libya to topple longtime dictator Muammar Gaddafi, generated mas-
sive emigration to the EU in the region of the Central Mediterranean. The escalation 
of the civil war in Syria, the emergence and quick expansion of the Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria, the protracted internal conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the chronic in-
stability in the Horn of Africa were additional factors contributing to the intensifica-
tion of migratory flows toward Europe. Insufficient control of external borders of the 
EU’s southern member states, especially Greece, provoked the flood of refugees and 
asylum seekers. The number of asylum applications lodged in EU member states rose 
from 257,000 in 2010 to 435,000 in 2013, 562,680 in 2014 and 1,321,600 in 2015. 
This exceptionally high number of applications was maintained in 2016, amounting to 
1,233,340.23 According to Eurostat, 61 percent of first time asylum applicants in 2016 
originated from Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq.24 
As mentioned in the introduction, the rapid increase in the number of asylum seek-
ers in the European Union coincided with a skyrocketing level of irregular immigra-
tion. The latter reflected serious security flaws at external borders and a substantive 
level of criminalization of migrants due to the use of illegal services offered by orga-
nized criminal gangs offering ‘facilitated access’ to the territory of EU member states 
by land or maritime routes. It was estimated that 90 percent of irregular migrants who 
reached the EU in 2015 used ‘facilitation services’. The number of facilitators detect-
ed was over 12,000. Europol claimed that the criminal assets from migrant smuggling 
could amount to around 3-6 billion Euro.25 Likewise, the number of iregular crossings 
of the EU’s external borders increased dramatically in 2015, reaching 1,822,337 cases 
registered by Frontex on the basis of information provided by national border authori-
ties from EU member states. As a reference, it is worth providing relevant data from 
previous years: 282,962 in 2014, 107,365 in 2013 and barely 72,437 in 2012.26 
Against the general backdrop of the migration crisis which started to arise in 2013 
and loomed large in 2015, the Mediterranean Basin was considered as a ‘soft underbel-
ly’ of the European continent. Indeed, the main migratory routes were concentrated in 
that region whereas the eastern borders of the EU member states, against all forecasts 
on the eve of the eastern enlargement of the European Union, were well guarded and 
23 Eurostat, “Asylum Statistics”, 13 March 2017, at <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/
index.php/Asylum_statistics>, 14 October 2017; Refugee Council Information, Asylum Seekers in 
Europe, March 2017, at <https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/assets/0004/0083/Asylum_in_Europe 
_March_2017.pdf>, 14 October 2017.
24 Eurostat, News Release, no. 46 (16 March 2017), at <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/ 
2995521/7921609/3-16032017-BP-EN.pdf/e5fa98bb-5d9d-4297-9168-d07c67d1c9e1>, 14 Octo-
ber 2017.
25 Europol, Migrant Smuggling in the EU, February 2016, at <https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/ 
default/files/documents/migrant_smuggling__europol_report_2016.pdf>, 18 March 2016.
26 Frontex, Annual Risk Analysis 2014, Warsaw, May 2014, p. 14; Frontex, Annual Risk Analysis 2016, 
Warsaw, March 2016, p. 16; Frontex, Annual Risk Analysis 2017, Warsaw, February 2017, p. 16.
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only incidentally crossed by irregular migrants.27 The Central Mediterranean consti-
tuted one of the main footbridges connecting the European continent with outer lands, 
namely the central section of the North African coast. Despite migratory pressure ex-
isting since the 1990s, the Central Mediterranean did not generate massive flows of 
migrants of asylum seekers. Unlike the western part of the Mediterranean, cumulating 
migration from Western Africa and Morocco heading for Spain, the central part repre-
sented occasional streams of migrants departing from Libya toward the Italian islands 
of Lampedusa and Sicily as well as toward Malta. As a result of the treaty of Friendship, 
Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya signed on 30 August 2008, coast 
guards of both countries began cooperating in intercepting and forcibly returning to 
Libya ‘boat people’ on the high seas, which had a clearly deterrent effect.
The Arab Spring in 2011 resulted in the rising wave of refugees from North Af-
rica: initially from Tunisia, then from Libya. The Italian island of Lampedusa became 
the main target for migrants. Their number, as detected for illegal border crossings, 
amounted to 64,261 in 2011, compared to 4,450 in the previous year.28 Although a sig-
nificant drop in the number of illegal border crossings occurred in 2012 (barely 10,000 
cases), the following year witnessed chaos in Libya, inflow of refugees from the Horn 
of Africa and the emergence of migrant smuggling networks. Risks associated with the 
long maritime route leading through high seas and the distance of 300 kms between 
Libyan shore and Lampedusa as well as the active presence of Libyan and Italian coast 
guards on their respective territorial waters ceased to be the principal deterrent fac-
tor. Masses of migrants found themselves in a desperate position, which makes them 
committed to risking their lives on a dangerous and exhausting trip to Europe. Tragic 
wreckages of overcrowded ships and boats as well as the rising death toll in the Central 
Mediterranean did not discourage African migrants from searching for every oppor-
tunity to get to European shores while putting their life at risk. As a consequence, the 
number of detections of illegal border crossings on the Central Mediterranean route 
saw a fourfold increase compared to 2012.29 This trend remained in 2014, when the 
number of detections jumped to over 170,000, which represented 60% of all illegal 
border crossings in the EU. Syrian refugees were the main group, ahead of traditional 
migrant nationalities of Eritreans, Somalis and Nigerians.30
On the eve of the migration crisis which erupted in the summer of 2015, the Cen-
tral Mediterranean turned into extended borderland characterized by high intensity of 
migratory flows, a growing number and variety of actors and increasingly complex in-
terconnections. Firstly, push factors generated in North Africa resulted to be persistent, 
long-term and dynamic. Therefore, endemic sources of instability, popular grievances 
and general discontent determined the kinetics of interactions between domestic, in-
27 For instance, in 2011 illegal crossings of the eastern borders route made up barely 0.7 percent of all 
registered cases. See Frontex, Annual Risk Analysis 2012, Warsaw, April 2012, p. 14.
28 Frontex, Annual Risk Analysis 2012, p. 46.
29 Frontex, Annual Risk Analysis 2014, p. 30.
30 Frontex, Annual Risk Analysis 2015, Warsaw, April 2015, pp. 18-20.
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ternalized and international actors, making them focus on exit strategies of migrants 
and deterrence strategies of potential host countries in the EU.
Secondly, the territorial disconnection in the Central Mediterranean initially elimi-
nated direct encounters of the main actors of the migratory/refugee ecosystem, namely 
migrants, asylum seekers, the authorities of the countries playing prominent roles in 
this region (mainly Italy, Malta, Tunisia and Libya) and international rescue groups, 
because of the existence of a relatively vast area of ‘no-man’s waters’: the high seas under 
international law of the sea. However, the growing number of sea incidents involving 
migrants and refugees, and especially the rising death toll, caused a reconfiguration of 
that ecosystem toward the reinforcement of search-and-rescue capabilities and elevated 
activeness of the main adversary actors: coast guards, criminal organizations and in-
ternational humanitarian groups. As a result, the previously ‘neutral’ waters between 
the territorial seas got populated by different categories of actors following often con-
tradictory rules and principles, yet united in the shared objective of turning the high 
seas in the Central Mediterranean to a kinetic ecosystem of extended borderland. As 
van Reekum tartly observed, all those involved – guards, smugglers, activists, research-
ers, migrants, aid workers, data engineers, politicians – have begun to incorporate in their 
practices the conflation of unauthorized passage and distress at sea. Emergency has become 
expected, recurrent and planned.31
Thirdly, the ‘migration crisis’ was triggered by the dynamic political events in the 
Middle East and North Africa which generated massive flows of migrants to Europe, 
especially in the eastern part of the Mediterranean. However, its structural causes were 
much more intricate and lied in accelerated economic, ideological, cultural and tech-
nological processes shaping identities in the globalized world.32 In addition, its dy-
namics was determined by humanitarian issues which were politicized and mediatized 
against the wide backdrop of ‘European values’, respect for and protection of human 
rights as well as the tradition of the post-colonial inclusionary approach toward immi-
grants.33 Pallister-Wilkins rightly noticed that the Mediterranean ‘migration crisis’ is the 
result of a complex socio-political landscape, genealogies of struggle, geopolitical upheavals 
and every day political practices.34 One should add to this observation, as the fourth argu-
ment, a reflection on the emergence and consolidation of the ‘virtual’ dimension of the 
central Mediterranean extended borderland as one of the key variables of the migration 
crisis. The global expansion of communication technologies has increased mobility 
31 R. van Reekum, “The Mediterranean: Migration Corridor, Border Spectacle, Ethical Landscape”, Me-
diterranean Politics, vol. 21, no. 2 (2016), p. 339, at <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2016.1145
828>.
32 See T.M. Wilson, H. Donnan, “Borders and Border Studies”, in iidem (eds.), A Companion to Border 
Studies, pp. 7-12, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118255223.ch1>.
33 See interesting remarks by Dario Melossi in: “The Processes of Criminalization of Migrants and the 
Borders of ‘Fortress Europe’”, in J. McCulloch, S. Pickering (eds.), Borders and Crime. Pre-Crime, Mo-
bility and Serious Harm in an Age of Globalization, Basingstoke–New York 2012, pp. 29-31.
34 P. Pallister-Wilkins, “Interrogating the Mediterranean ‘Migration Crisis’”, Mediterranean Politics, 
vol. 21, no. 2 (2016), p. 312, at <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2016.1145826>.
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and cross-border movements (of information, material goods, people and capital) and 
facilitated social networking based on human-to-human transmission of information, 
ideas and visions. It largely facilitated the planning and following of migratory routes, 
increasing the chances of reaching Europe’s external borders. Likewise, it stimulated the 
booming of a crime-as-a-service business model35 implemented by migrant smuggling 
networks in their illicit activities.36 Moreover, it legitimized enormous search-and-res-
cue efforts undertaken by international governmental and non-governmental actors 
which increased their capacities of detecting, identifying and positioning migrants at 
sea. Therefore, ‘virtualization’ of the SAR ecosystem reinforced the complex nature of 
the central Mediterranean extended borderland.
Reorientation of migrant flows in the summer of 2015 in the wake of the opening of 
the eastern Mediterranean route through the Aegean Sea reduced pressures in the cen-
tral part of the Mediterranean. The overall number of illegal border crossings in the EU 
fell threefold in 2016 (to 511,371) due to the EU-Turkey declaration which provided 
for substantive EU’s financial assistance to Turkey and Turkey’s agreement to secure 
its maritime and land borders facing increased migratory pressures. This political act 
brought about a drastic reduction of migrants crossing Turkish-Greek maritime border 
in the Aegean Sea or seeking alternative routes. Meanwhile, the quickly growing num-
ber of migrants from Africa (reaching the record high of over 170,000 in 2016) shifted 
the point of gravity from the eastern part of the Mediterranean back to its central area. 
The number of detections of illegal border crossings in the Central Mediterranean rose 
by 18% in 2016 and amounted to 181,459, almost reaching the level of the eastern 
Mediterranean (182,277).37 As mentioned above, the huge majority were nationals of 
African countries, arriving from sub-Sahara, West Africa and the Horn of Africa. Tradi-
tional nationalities such as Somalis and Eritreans were outnumbered by Nigerians. This 
trend was reinforced in the first half of 2017. The number of illegal border crossings 
in the Central Mediterranean kept its growth rate, substantially exceeding appropriate 
indicators in the eastern part of the Mediterranean.38
This has represented a considerable challenge for state and intergovernmental ac-
tors involved in managing the complex central Mediterranean borderland. Pull factors 
generated by SAR operations and increasingly competitive smuggling groups (which 
considerably reduced the price for a boat journey from Libya’s shore to the SAR area39) 
35 Europol, Migrant Smuggling..., p. 9.
36 According to Frontex, 96% of newly-arrived migrants interviewed in the Central Mediterranean region 
stated that they had used the services of smuggling networks to illegally enter the EU – Frontex, Annual 
Risk Analysis 2017, p. 8.
37 Ibid., p. 19.
38 The number of illegal border crossings in the central Mediterranean was 24,296 in the first quarter of 
2017, whereas in the eastern Mediterranean amounted to roughly 6,000. See Frontex, FRAN Quar-
terly, no. 1 (2017), p. 8, at <http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_
Q1_2017.pdf>, 14 October 2017.
39 See M. Micallef, The Human Conveyor Belt. Trends in Human Trafficking and Smuggling in Post-re-
volution Libya, Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, Geneva, March 2017, p. 45.
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‘awakened’ migrants from those parts of Africa which suffered poor economic and so-
cial conditions as well as political instability and ethnic conflicts instead of civil war, in-
discriminate violence or extreme poverty, which dominated as push factors in the case 
of Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea or Somalia. The extension of the central Mediterranean 
borderland helped to tackle the humanitarian crisis but produced negative effects for 
border management and surveillance policies performed by European states either in-
dividually (Italy) or in joint international operations.
The following subchapter seeks to analyze the most relevant forms of international 
activities undertaken in the Central Mediterranean by the key collective actors of Eu-
ropean security.
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS IN THE CENTRAL 
MEDITERRANEAN
The Mediterranean region since the early 2000s has been an area of active international 
engagement in security-related missions and operations. If taken in broad terms, this 
area has witnessed numerous UN-led peace-keeping operations concentrating interna-
tional efforts in the Middle East. The Arab-Israeli conflict, the civil war in Lebanon 
and the Palestine question forced the United Nations to keep ‘blue helmets’ in that ex-
plosive region. Moreover, the internal strife and division of Cyprus as well as the wars 
in the former Yugoslavia added new hotspots to the Mediterranean imbroglio. UN 
missions were deployed also there, seeking to prevent further escalation of violence.40
However, all those UN-led operations were land-based; they were not entailing 
a massive navy presence and were conducted rather far from maritime operational the-
atre. Other multinational security actors in the Euro-Atlantic area possessed their mari-
time assets in the Mediterranean. In 1992, NATO activated its Standing Naval Force of 
Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), with headquarters in Naples. Its objectives in-
cluded operational training, visits to various ports of the Mediterranean basin and the 
Black Sea as well as maritime inspections contributing to the enforcement of weapons 
embargo against Yugoslavia.41 The Western European Union was also strengthening 
its presence in the Mediterranean basin. Since 1992, it supported NATO’s STANAV-
FORMED in ensuring effective embargo in the Adriatic.42 In 1996, it put forward an 
initiative of a multinational on-call naval force EUROMARFOR, capable to launch 
within days and carry out joint crisis management operations.43
40 See G. Kostakos, “UN Peace-keeping Missions in the Mediterranean Region”, in R. Gillespie (ed.), 
Mediterranean Politics, vol. 1, London–Cranbury, NJ 1994, pp. 58-71.
41 J.G. Gade, P.S. Hilde, “NATO and the Maritime Domain”, in J.I. Bekkevold, G. Till (eds.), Internatio-
nal Order at Sea. How it Is Challenged. How it Is Maintained, London 2016, p. 118.
42 B. Germond, The Maritime Dimension of European Security. Seapower and the European Union, Ba-
singstoke–New York 2015, pp. 155-156.
43 Idem, “Multinational Military Cooperation and its Challenges: The Case of European Naval Opera-
35POLITEJA (5)50/2017 European Borders in Turbulent Times…
Only the beginning of the 21st century brought an important change, extending the 
reach of international operations onto maritime area. In the wake of the 9/11, NATO 
launched its maritime operation “Active Endeavour” patrolling the Mediterranean and 
monitoring ships in order to help deter and prevent terrorist-related activities. In March 
2003, the operation was expanded to include escorts through the Straits of Gibraltar 
provided to non-military ships from NATO member states upon their request. Since 
mid-2004, “Active Endeavour” covered the whole of the Mediterranean. Whenever re-
quired, the operation was supported by STANAVFORMED, which in 2005 was re-
named Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2). At that time, NATO partners 
started contributing with logistical and information support and even, since 2006, de-
ploying vessels. In 2010, following the adoption of a new operational plan, “Active En-
davour” shifted from platform-based to a network-based operation, using a combination 
of on-call units and surge operations instead of deployed forces.44 New tasks were added, 
particularly information gathering and analysis for the sake of improved Maritime Situ-
ational Awareness.
With the increasing intensity of migration flow across the Mediterranean, both na-
tion states and international actors began to reformulate their policies and reconsider 
the scope and nature of their military presence in that region. A significant difference 
could be noticed between the EU’s and NATO’s approach to the migration issue as 
well as its direct and anticipated consequences. The European Union highlighted hu-
manitarian aspects of migratory flows, pointing to root causes of the increasing scale of 
migration and displacements such as political instability in North Africa in the wake 
of the Arab Spring, the civil war in Syria, protracted conflicts in Iraq and Afghani-
stan, poverty and state failure in the Horn of Africa. The growing number of human 
tragedies, including drowning deaths in the Mediterranean, mobilised the Union to 
undertake search and rescue actions to prevent further loss of life at sea. In addition, 
EU officials were aware of the fact that the massive flow of people from Africa and the 
Middle East was partially stimulated and accelerated by numerous criminal gangs in-
volved in organized trafficking in human beings and smuggling of people. Therefore, 
they were committed to start fighting the smugglers by systematic monitoring, sur-
veillance and patrolling Mediterranean waters to detect, identify, capture and destroy 
suspected boats and vessels before they are used by traffickers. NATO was more preoc-
cupied with security consequences and potential risks and threats to the Alliance’s sta-
bility and safety posed by massive migratory flows toward Europe. 
Well before the European Union took formal steps and adopted necessary legal 
measures, one of its member states, namely Italy,45 had launched a maritime operation 
tions in the Wider Mediterranean Area”, International Relations, vol. 22, no. 2 (2008), pp. 181-183, at 
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117808089894>.
44 “Operation Active Endeavour”, NATO, at <https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_7932.
htm>, 12 October 2017.
45 Italy participated in a maritime international operation already in 1997. Facing political chaos as well 
as social and economic decay in Albania, Italy took a lead in multinational military force established 
on grounds of UN Security Council’s resolution 1101. Although the coalition of 11 European states 
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dubbed “Mare Nostrum” in order to tackle the dramatic increase in immigration flows 
from North Africa and intensify proactive search and rescue (SAR) activities in the 
Strait of Sicily. The operation began in October 2013 and was triggered by a trage-
dy close to the shores of Lampedusa where an overcrowded fishing boat with more 
than 500 Eritreans and Somalis smuggled by an armed gang sank off the coast. 366 mi-
grants died.46 The operation engaged at least 1,000 personnel from Italian armed forces 
(mainly Navy and Air Force) supported by the Coast Guard, Police, Carabinieri and Fi-
nancial Police as well as Red Cross military corps and governmental agencies involved 
in migratory policy.47 It lasted one year before it was superseded in October 2014 by 
the EU-led operation “Triton”. “Mare Nostrum” was a relative success in humanitarian 
terms. More than 140,000 people were rescued.48 However, it constituted a serious or-
ganizational and military effort as well as a financial burden for the Italian government. 
Its costs equaled EUR 9 million per month and the EU contributed with roughly EUR 
1.8 million. Moreover, some observers criticized its counterproductive effect in terms 
of tackling the migration challenge. They argued that effective SAR activities are an 
undesirable pull factor, encouraging more migrants to attempt sea crossing and thereby 
leading to more tragic and unnecessary deaths.49
The operation “Triton” was coordinated by Frontex (then EU Agency for the Man-
agement of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of Member States) as one 
was tasked to restore order and prevent Albania from further descending into anarchy and lawlessness, 
it also sought to stop massive migration outflows from Albania, including interception and return of 
Albanian migrants. See R. Marchiò, “Operation Alba”. A European Approach to Peace Support Opera-
tions in the Balkans, Carlisle, PA 2000; B. Germond, E. Grove, Maritime Security in the Mediter ranean. 
European and Transatlantic Approaches, Mediterranean Paper Series, The German Marshall Fund of 
the United States, Washington 2010, p. 14. In 2004, an operation “Constant Vigilance” started in the 
Central Mediterranean aiming at surveillance, search and rescue of migrants leaving North African ter-
ritorial waters. Following the Arab Spring, the Italian Navy conducted 139 rescue missions in the years 
2011-2013, saving more than 16,000 people. See P. Cuttitta, “Humanitarianism and Migration in the 
Mediterranean Borderscape: The Italian-North African Border between Sea Patrols and Integration 
Measures”, in C. Brambilla et al. (eds.), Borderscaping. Imaginations and Practices of Border Making, 
London–New York 2016, p. 131; E. Cusumano, “Emptying the Sea with a Spoon? Non-governmental 
Providers of Migrants Search and Rescue in the Mediterranean”, Marine Policy, vol. 75 (2017), p. 92, at 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.10.008>.
46 L. Davies, “Lampedusa Boat Tragedy is ‘Slaughter of Innocents’ Says Italian President”, The Guardian, 
3 October 2013, at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/03/lampedusa-boat-tragedy- 
italy-migrants>, 12 October 2017.
47 “Mare Nostrum Operation”, Ministero della Difesa, at <http://www.marina.difesa.it/EN/operations 
/Pagine/MareNostrum.aspx>, 10 October 2017.
48 “Operation Mare Nostrum to End – Frontex Triton Operation Will Not Ensure Rescue at Sea of Mi-
grants in International Waters”, Asylum Information Database, 13 October 2014, at <http://www.
asylumineurope.org/news/13-10-2014/operation-mare-nostrum-end-frontex-triton-operation-will-
not-ensure-rescue-sea>, 12 October 2017.
49 A. Taylor, “Why Britain Won’t Save Drowning Migrants in the Mediterranean”, The Washington 
Post, 28 October 2014, at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/10/28/
why-britain-wont-save-drowning-migrants-in-the-mediterranean/?utm_term=.d5f885729210>, 
12 October 2017.
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of its joint operations.50 Launched in November 2014, it had similar humanitarian tasks 
as “Mare Nostrum” yet much more limited political objectives, territorial reach and 
 financial resources. It was planned as a border mission aiming to ensure effective sur-
veillance and border control in the Mediterranean region and especially support Ital-
ian authorities in protecting Italy’s maritime borders from massive irregular crossing by 
migrants. It was focused on Italy’s territorial waters (within a radius of 30 nautical miles 
from the Italian coast) and not international waters, where the largest number of mi-
grants were exposed to the risk of drowning or death by dehydration. Moreover, its ini-
tial budget was roughly EUR 2.9 million per month and EU member states’ equipment 
contribution was limited to two surveillance aircrafts and three patrol vessels.51
Similarly to the sinking of the boat with Somali and Eritrean migrants in October 
2013, another terrible tragedy occurred in the Central Mediterranean. On 19 April 
2015, a Libyan trawler with over 850 migrants aboard sank in the high seas between 
Libya’s coast and the Italian island of Lampedusa. Despite a coordinated massive res-
cue operation, only 28 migrants survived.52 Following the EU summit several days after 
the tragedy, the operation “Triton” shifted from surveillance and border protection to 
SAR operation in a far more extended zone: 138 nautical miles south of Sicily. More-
over, the technical assets were strengthened and the budget was tripled.53 Nevertheless, 
poor equipment and a small multinational staff involved in this operation did not help 
reducing either the number of migrants crossing the central Mediterranean maritime 
area or the death toll and the scope of human smuggling.
Following the April 2015 migrant boat tragedy, the European Union decided to run 
another mission: that time under the Common Security and Defence Policy, with the 
aim of preventing further loss of life at sea and to tackle the root causes of the human emer-
gency.54 On 18 May 2015, the Council adopted a decision on the European Union mili-
tary operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFORMED)55 which 
was launched in late June 2015. Three months later, the mission was renamed Opera-
tion “Sophia”. It was designed as a military crisis management operation contributing to 
50 R. Mungianu, Frontex and Non-Refoulement. The International Responsibility of the EU, Cambridge 
2016, pp. 200-202.
51 European Commission, “Frontex Joint Operation ‘Triton’ – Concerted efforts to manage migration 
in the Central Mediterranean”, MEMO/14/566, Brussels, 7 October 2014, at <http://europa.eu/ 
rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-566_en.htm>, 10 October 2014.
52 P. Kingsley, A. Bonomolo, S. Kirchgaessner, “700 Migrants Feared Dead in Mediterranean Ship-
wreck”, The Guardian, 19 April 2015, at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/19/700-
migrants-feared-dead-mediterranean-shipwreck-worst-yet>, 12 October 2017.
53 Frontex, “Frontex expands its Joint Operation Triton”, 26 May 2015, at <http://frontex.europa.eu/
news/frontex-expands-its-joint-operation-triton-udpbHP>, 12 October 2017.
54 European Council, “Special meeting of the European Council, 23 April 2015 – statement”, at <http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/04/23/special-euco-statement/>, 24 April 
2015.
55 Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a European Union military operation in the 
Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED), Official Journal of the European Union, 
L 122, 19 May 2015.
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the disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the 
Southern Central Mediterranean.56 It was planned to unfold in three sequential phases: 
(1) information gathering and patrolling on the high seas to support the detection and
monitoring of migration networks; (2) conduct boarding, search, seizure and diversion 
of vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafficking, initially acting
on the high seas, next operating in both territorial and internal waters of the ‘coastal
state’, namely Libya; (3) all necessary measures against vessels used for human smug-
gling or trafficking, also through disposing of them or rendering them inoperable.57 De-
spite tackling human smuggling and criminal networks, EUNAVFOR MED quickly
transformed into classical SAR forces with some extended specific tasks including the
training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy, conducting surveillance and gathering
information on illegal trafficking of oil exports from Libya as well as enhancing the
possibility for sharing information on human trafficking with member states’ law en-
forcement services, as well as with EU agencies: Frontex and Europol. However, with-
out permission to enter Libya’s territorial waters, ships belonging to Task Force Sophia
cannot proceed with Phase 2B, which is focused on dismantling criminal networks and 
destroying their assets.
The booming business of illegal migration in the Mediterranean as well as evidences 
of proliferation of illicit activities (such as drug trafficking, arms smuggling and docu-
ment frauds) and transmission of threats (terrorism, jihadism and islamic radicalism) 
into the North Atlantic area activated mechanisms of collective non-article 5 security 
action. At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, NATO leaders agreed to launch a mari-
time operation in the Mediterranean extending the scope of the anti-terror Operation 
“Active Endeavour”. The latter was terminated in November 2016 when “Sea Guard-
ian” became operational. The main purpose of the Operation “Sea Guardian” has been 
to build and uphold situational awareness, deter and counter terrorism and contrib-
ute to maritime capacity building.58 “Sea Guardian” was conceptualized as a flexible 
maritime operation that is able to perform the full range of maritime security tasks, if 
so decided by the North Atlantic Council. As was the case of “Active Endeavour”, NA-
TO’s tasks were carried out by the Standing Maritime Group Two (SNMG2) – a mul-
tinational, integrated maritime force. Although it was initially deployed on the eastern 
Mediterranean, SNMG2 began focused security operations in high seas of the Central 
Mediterranean in early 2017, patrolling the main shipping routes in coordination with 
aircrafts and submarines provided by the Allies, monitoring maritime traffic and gath-
ering information about vessels. 
At NATO’s Warsaw summit, the Joint NATO-EU declaration was adopted in or-
der to give new impetus and new substance to the NATO-EU strategic partnership.59 The 
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 “Operation Sea Guardian”, NATO, at <https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_136233.htm>, 
14 October 2017.
59 “Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commis-
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tasks outlined for both organizations included, amongst others, Broaden[ing] and 
adapt[ation of ] our operational cooperation including at sea, and on migration, through 
increased sharing of maritime situational awareness as well as better coordination and 
mutual reinforcement of our activities in the Mediterranean and elsewhere.60 The reorga-
nization of NATO’s operational activities in the Mediterranean Sea was one of the di-
rect consequences of the Warsaw declaration. In addition, in December 2016 Defence 
Ministers of the Allies agreed on a common set of proposals for the implementation 
of the Joint Declaration, including operational cooperation on maritime issues. The 
ministers announced their will to enhance cooperation and coordination between Opera-
tion Sea Guardian and EU NAVFOR MED Sophia in the Mediterranean, through in-
formation sharing and logistical support and through practical interaction between the two 
operations.61 As a result, NATO ships carried out focused security patrols in the cen-
tral Mediterranean Sea, specifically in the international waters off the coast of Libya. 
SNMG2 operated quite often in the maritime area covered by the EU’s “Sophia”, which 
opened up the way for cooperation on information sharing and logistical support, spe-
cifically to avoid duplication in tasks and improve the operational picture of maritime 
activities in the international waters of the central Mediterranean Sea. As to the latter, 
an independent Maritime Situational Awareness patrol was deployed in mid-2017 in 
order to reinforce reconnaissance capacities and practice information sharing on a real-
time basis.
The above outlined nature and scope of international activities in extended bor-
derland in the Central Mediterranean indicated Pierre Hassner’s concept of moving 
borderlands and fixed borders. The actions undertaken firstly by Italy and then the EU 
and NATO have shown that the dynamics of migratory issue, especially the massive in-
flow of migrants to Libya seeking easy transportation routes toward Europe, produced 
a dual response on the part of European actors. Firstly, the extension of Italian bor-
derland on international waters for humanitarian purposes (SAR actions); secondly, 
efforts at fixing maritime borders of Italy and Malta exposed to massive illegal cross-
ings. Both Italian and international activities in the central Mediterranean Sea brought 
about a generally unexpected and unwanted effect of concentrating SAR actions close 
to the Libyan borderland with a view to reduce the number of fatal incidents and in-
crease the probability of success in the rescue operations. Therefore, the Italian mari-
time border was in a sense stretched over the vast area between Libya and Italy and its 
effective protection became subject to coordinated actions carried out by ships partici-
pating in NATO’s and EU’s operations.
sion, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, NATO, 8 July 2016, at 
<https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133163.htm>, 10 July 2016.
60 Ibid.
61 “Statement on the implementation of the Joint Declaration signed by the President of the European 
Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization”, NATO, 6 December 2016, at <https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_
texts_138829.htm>, 8 December 2016.
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CONCLUSIONS
Turbulences at Europe’s borders, which were caused by the massive inflow of migrants 
and asylum seekers and the sudden local boom for individual and organized human 
smuggling, have had serious, negative and far-reaching consequences for internal se-
curity, international cooperation and public order in the majority of the EU’s member 
states. In this paper, I have presented arguments upholding my claim that the migratory 
crisis triggered persistent effects of creating a specific migratory ecosystem in the Medi-
terranean which became deeply rooted in extended borderlands that emerged in the 
eastern and central regions of the Mediterranean Sea.
The concept of extended borderland highlights the importance of multiple actors 
present there, their interests and roles as well as interconnected activities undertaken 
with regard to overall strategy, general objectives or specific goals and selected targets. 
Symbiotic relationships and synergetic connections have emerged both in horizontal as 
well as vertical dimensions. From the first perspective, state actors have enhanced co-
operation and assistance in order to increase institutional efficiency and political legiti-
mation of their protective and lifesaving measures; non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) have activated their human, material and information assets for the sake of 
effective rescue activities; criminal networks have intensified their illicit business of hu-
man smuggling and trafficking taking advantage of weaknesses of state actors (chaos in 
Libya, limited competences of NATO’s and EU’s forces; international legal constraints) 
as well as growing demand on the part of migrant population. Likewise, in such com-
plex migratory ecosystem, specific interactions have become structured between state 
actors, NGOs and criminal networks. The elimination by the EU and NATO of larger 
ships and boats utilized by smugglers reduced the chances for a safe transit to the Ital-
ian or Maltan borders, yet at the same time moved the center of gravity to the high seas 
close to Libya’s territorial waters. Migrants were boarded on inflatable boats capable 
to transport them for a relatively short distance off the Libyan coast. The elevated risk 
of drowning of ‘boat people’ activated both NGOs and international naval forces de-
ployed in the central Mediterranean Sea to extend their presence near the Libyan terri-
tory, which in turn restored migrants’ confidence in transportation services offered by 
smugglers. In some extreme cases, several NGOs were accused of entering into contact 
with smugglers who preferred to hand over migrants to rescue ships instead of leaving 
them in the high seas.62
Intricate connections between actors and roles they play in extended borderland 
reflect the phenomenon of conflict ecosystems which are formed in a complex environ-
ment encompassing mechanisms of cooperation and discord. They contain both pre-
62 L. Dearden, “Italy Seizes Refugee Rescue Ship Accused of Having Contact with Libyan Smugglers”, The 
Independent, 3 August 2017, at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/italy-refugee- 
rescue-ship-jugend-rettet-libyan-smugglers-mediterranean-migrant-boats-lampedusa-a7875371.
html>, 16 October 2017; N. Farrell, “Are We Helping Desperate Migrants – or Just People Smug-
glers?”, The Observer, 1 April 2017, at <https://www.spectator.co.uk/2017/04/are-we-helping-
desperate-migrants-or-just-people-smugglers/>, 16 October 2017.
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emptive intervention practices such as those employed by the Italian Navy in the Op-
eration “Mare Nostrum”63, as well as repressive measures adopted for law enforcement 
and restoration and maintenance of order as in the case of the Operation “Sophia” and 
the Operation “Sea Guardian”. While they bring about relative stabilization and de-es-
calation of tensions and feuds, prospects for termination of conflicts and litigations are 
postponed indefinitely. The migration crisis in the central region of the Mediterranean 
Sea has provided numerous evidences for this argument.
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